The myth of the Great Patriotic War as a justification for the invasion of Ukraine. Part 2 – Remembrance and Propaganda in the Putin Era

Vladimir Putin took power in 1999 as the second president of the Russian Federation. Relatively quickly, he began to recreate the myth of the Great Patriotic War, attaching more and more importance to it over the years. For him, it became an extremely important element of the historical policy aimed at uniting Russian society. For over 20 years of his rule, Vladimir Putin has increasingly emphasised his attachment to the legend of World War II. It was actively used by the Russian president and the Kremlin propaganda apparatus to justify the Kremlin’s imperialist ambitions. In this text, we will look at the use of the Great Patriotic War in the Kremlin’s policy until the invasion of Ukraine.

First years in power

The 1990s were marked by the mass declassification of historical sources, a freer exchange of ideas, and openness to criticism of the past. Some circles, such as communists or nationalists, were very dissatisfied with this turn of events. This period was associated with economic shock therapy, as well as destabilisation of power and often chaos in the state. Examples include the communist coup attempt in Moscow, or the constitutional crisis that ended in bloody clashes on the streets of the capital. Many Russians felt lost and somehow betrayed as a result of the collapse of the USSR. As a result, there was a growing sentiment for the Soviet era, which was associated with stability, a sense of power, and prosperity. In such a political and economic landscape, Vladimir Putin came to power.

One of the first decisions of the new president in the field strongly related to historical policy was to restore the anthem of the Soviet Union as the anthem of the Russian Federation. The lyrics were changed, but the original melody was retained. The USSR was associated by the Russians with a global superpower, and the restored anthem was to remind that the country was still strong. As a result, this decision was met with enthusiasm among many citizens.

Władimir Putin na pierwszej sesji parlamentarnej rosyjskiej Dumy Państwowej, 18 stycznia 2000 rok. Kremlin.ru, CC BY 3.0 — Putin at the first parliamentary session of the State Duma, January 18, 2000. Kremlin.ru, CC BY 3.0

The first years of Vladimir Putin’s rule were associated with experiments in the field of historical policy. Attempts were made to build legends connecting Russians on the basis of the reigns of Tsar Alexander II or Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin. They had virtually no effect as the society did not feel much attachment to these figures. Over the years of Putin’s rule, numerous historical events and figures have been used in propaganda on an ad hoc basis. Alexander Nevsky or Ivan the Terrible were used, holidays were created to commemorate the end of the Great Sorrow, the defeat of Napoleon, or to commemorate the victims of World War I. They were often given an anti-Western character or were used as a justification of Russia’s imperial aspirations. However, in the end, one theme remained universal, as the Polish historian, Dr Hieronim Grala, summed up:

“Therefore, if we are to look for any permanent element of the historical narrative in Putin’s historical deliberations, independent of the political requirements of the moment, then we can point to only one theme: the victory of the USSR in the Great Patriotic War.”

The Great Patriotic War returns into the spotlight

World War II has always been important for Russia and the Russians. In the first years of Putin’s rule, however, it was not the central point of the entire historical policy. This began to change at the turn of the first and second decade of the twenty-first century, although the first steps in this direction had already been taken earlier. In 2006, Vladimir Putin created the title of “City of Military Glory” by decree. It was the equivalent of the title of the Hero City introduced by Stalin. In this way, towns that distinguished themselves with particularly heroic defence during World War II were honoured. Currently, 47 cities hold this title. Melitopol and Mariupol received them after the start of the occupation by the Russian Federation in 2022.

In 2008, the full military component was restored at the Victory Day parade on 9 May, including heavy military equipment and planes. The following years brought more and more impressive parades, culminating in the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II in 2015. The militarisation of victory parades was associated with replacing the trauma of the Great Patriotic War with a display of power and strength. The subject of the suffering and loss of human life had to give way to the whirr of tank engines, the sound of the steady march of soldiers, and the noise of military aircraft. The whole environment was aimed at familiarising citizens with violence in foreign policy. Such a presentation of Russia was not only internal, but also external. Moscow showed the West that it was not worth it to choose confrontation.

Parada z okazji Dnia Zwycięstwa, 9 maja 2012. Kremlin.ru, CC BY 3.0 — Victory Day Parade, May 9, 2012. Kremlin.ru, CC BY 3.0

Russia as the Messiah of Nations

A particularly important year for building the myth of the Great Patriotic War turned out to be 2012, when Putin returned to the presidency after a four-year break. From that moment on, the Kremlin’s vision of World War II became the dominant part of Moscow’s historical propaganda message. This was related to economic problems and political protests. External factors, such as the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity or Western sanctions imposed after Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014, also had a significant impact.

Decision-makers in the Kremlin needed a strong unifying myth and legitimacy of their power and actions. The myth of the Great Patriotic War was the perfect tool for this purpose. The victory in World War II was elevated almost to a religion-like status. The USSR, and therefore Russia as its direct successor, has been treated by propaganda as a winner over absolute evil. Narratives at the time emphasised that Europe should be grateful for liberation, and that it owes its current prosperity to the defeat of the Wehrmacht by the Red Army.

Russian documents clearly say that “a revision of Russia’s role in history” is a threat to the existence of the state. Numerous studies published by the Kremlin’s government apparatus after 2009 clearly indicate the needs of Russian historical policy. It is about, among other things, building a collective myth of the Great Patriotic War, which shall unite the society under the umbrella of the state. It is to show that Russia is a superpower, and Russians are a strong nation. At the same time, the role of the peoples of the Russian Federation in defeating fascism is also actively emphasised. This is important because the authorities in the Kremlin need all citizens to be able to identify with its historical policy. Therefore, the myth of the Great Patriotic War is to be commonly associated with and based on dogmas, and any attempt to refute it shall be treated as an attack on Russia’s identity. This way of thinking was manifested e.g. by the introduction in 2014 of a law prohibiting “deliberate, public dissemination of false information about the activities of the USSR during World War II”. Such activities are punishable by severe penalties, including imprisonment.

The Immortal Regiment Takeover

In 2012, three independent journalists from Tomsk launched the “Immortal Regiment” initiative. It was aimed at commemorating the victims of World War II. It was organised in the form of a march, during which participants carried photos of their loved ones who in one way or another suffered as a result of the Great Patriotic War. According to the organisers, the aim was to commemorate the people who were not appreciated by the state’s historical policy, including prisoners of war who were treated as traitors in Soviet times. In 2015, similar marches took place in ca. 1,200 cities.

However, the authorities in the Kremlin did not want to leave this grassroots initiative unsupervised. They wanted to make sure that every commemoration of World War II was sanctioned by the state and served Russia’s imperialist interests. Therefore, in 2015, a march under the same name was organised in Moscow, and people who were supposed to take part in the original event were forced to participate in the state celebrations. The march was led by Vladimir Putin himself and dignitaries from friendly countries. As part of the school classes, children were involved carrying portraits of random people, thus completely contradicting the original idea. The authorities stripped the Immortal Regiment initiative of personal experience, turning it into a propaganda tool. The above example perfectly illustrates the policy of the Kremlin’s decision-makers — any commemoration of World War II must include the authorities. Everything must take place under the tutelage of the state and be in accordance with the established doctrine.

Putin na czele marszu Nieśmiertelnego Pułku, 2018. Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0 — Putin at the head of the Immortal Regiment march, 2018. Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0

World War II in foreign policy

A perfect example of a direct use of the myth of the Great Patriotic War is Russia’s contemporary foreign policy. The sacralisation of this myth and its messianic overtones are a perfect tool for justifying and legitimising the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions. For the Russians, the peak of power was in the period immediately after World War II. Therefore, decision-makers in the Kremlin are striving to refer, in one form or another, to that period. In Moscow’s vision, its zone of interest is to extend to the post-Soviet states and the former Eastern Bloc.

The myth of World War II is an excellent tool for that. Russia does not accept any other narrative than that the Red Army brought liberation to the countries of Eastern Europe. Violence against the civilian population, the introduction of communist order by force, or the brutal suppression of independence circles in other countries do not fit into the historical policy of the Kremlin. Any criticism of the international policy of the USSR is immediately considered an attack on modern Russia. The legitimacy of the use of force in foreign policy is a particularly important element here.

Pomnik Żołnierzy Radzieckich w Berlinie-Tiergarten. Duralupe5, CC BY-SA 3.0 — Soviet War Memorial in Berlin-Tiergarten. Duralupe5, CC BY-SA 3.0

The Kremlin’s anti-Polish rhetoric

The Kremlin’s propaganda is revising the historical aspects of World War II. The years 1939-1941, inconvenient for Russia due to its alliance with Berlin, have been reevaluated. In its historical policy, the USSR denied the existence of a secret protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Putin’s Russia changed this approach, pointing out that it was necessary for the security of the Soviet Union, and its signing was fully justified. Since 2019, the responsibility for the outbreak of World War II has been shifted to the West.

Blaming Poland for the outbreak of World War II

One of the elements of pushing away responsibility is accusing Poland of close cooperation with the German Reich. This is to be confirmed by the “Munich Betrayal”, as Russian propaganda calls the Munich Agreement of 1938. In fact, the Republic of Poland was not a party to these agreements, although as a result of them it received Trans-Olza. At the same time, the Kremlin’s pseudo-historical narratives indicate that Poland would take an active part in the persecution and murder of Jews.

All of this can be seen as the already mentioned shifting responsibility from Russia for World War II, which, as a result of the “betrayal” of the West (especially Poland), was forced to reach an agreement with Germany. On the other hand, the Reich, according to Russian propaganda, was pushed into war mainly by the behaviour of Poland, which did not want to reach an agreement with Hitler. As a result, the Soviet Union then had to “save” Europe. The interpretation of historical policy towards World War II was presented in a text written by Vladimir Putin in 2020 entitled: “The Real Lessons of the 75th Anniversary of World War II“. It has been widely criticised by historians.

Disputing Katyn

One of the most outrageous aspects of Russia’s anti-Polish historical rhetoric is its justification of the Katyn massacre. In the early 1990s, Russia admitted and apologised for the Katyn massacre. However, in the second decade of Putin’s rule, things changed drastically. In recent years, the authorities in the Kremlin have been reinforcing the narrative circulating for years that the Katyn massacre was justified. It would allegedly be a just revenge for the extermination of Soviet prisoners of war by Poland during the Polish-Bolshevik war. In reality, no such extermination ever happened, and the numbers inflated by Russian propaganda should be considered false. The findings of the Polish-Russian commission from 2004 clearly indicate that the Polish authorities did everything in their power to treat the prisoners with dignity. However, as a result of the shortage of resources in the newly nascent state, many POWs died of diseases. Epidemics and health problems also affected civilians and Polish soldiers. Therefore, the conclusion about the deliberate extermination of the Red Army soldiers does not hold.

Las katyński, w tle Polski Cmentarz Wojskowy w Katyniu. Saper, CC BY 3.0 — Katyn Forest. In the background the Polish Military Cemetery in Katyn. Saper, CC BY 3.0

On Ukraine

The Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity at the turn of 2013 and 2014 was an extremely important event defining Russia’s foreign policy in the region. The myth of the Great Patriotic War was quickly used to justify the aggressive actions of the Kremlin authorities. Terms like “fascism” and “Nazism” became commonly used in relation to Ukraine and its inhabitants. Like Poles, Ukrainians also began to be accused of anti-Semitism and collaboration with the Third Reich. The whole situation was supposed to herald the revival of Banderism and extreme nationalism inspired by the USA and the European Union. In the vision of Moscow, Ukraine is a part of the “Russian world”, bonded by strong historical ties of the common struggle against Nazism during World War II. Brotherhood during the Great Patriotic War is supposed to be a myth uniting post-Soviet countries under the leadership of Russia.

Pomnik Matki Ojczyzny w Kijowie. Część Muzeum historii Ukrainy w II wojnie światowej. Ольга Майстренко, CC BY-SA 3.0 — Monument to the Motherland in Kyiv. Part of the Museum of the History of Ukraine in World War II. Olga Majstrenko, CC BY-SA 3.0

The Kremlin’s propaganda also seeks to create the impression that the conflict in Ukraine is an extension of the war against Nazism. Russia’s historical mission of defeating fascism has not been completed, and it is now upon new generations to continue it. To strengthen this, propagandists decided to evoke extreme emotions supporting this vision and restoring the trauma of World War II, for example by fabricating the story of a crucified child. The 3-year-old was allegedly nailed to a cross on Lenin Square in Sloviansk in revenge for the fact that he came from a family of Russian separatists. The crime was to be committed by the “Banderites”.

In fact, however, the only witness to this event did not live in Sloviansk at all. What is more, there is no Lenin Square in the city of Sloviansk. In addition to the obvious biblical-messianic connotations, the story was also intended to show that the Russian mission of “fighting Nazism” has not yet been accomplished. It was supposed to be a proof that the descendants of the Nazis were still committing crimes in Ukraine. On the other hand, it is Russia’s duty to defend the civilian population of eastern Ukraine like the Red Army protecting the population of Eastern Europe from Nazism with its own breast. The above example is just one of many, and the propaganda myth of the Great Patriotic War was yet to be used in its full form after February 22, 2024.

The Great Patriotic War in the eyes of the Russians

An extremely interesting issue is how World War II, with particular emphasis on the war against Germany, is perceived by the Russian society. For years, the authorities in Moscow have been making sure that the discourse on this issue is consistent and coherent. In 2024, the independent television channel Дождь (Rain TV) organised a poll. They asked respondents whether surrendering Leningrad to the Germans during World War II would have been a better solution and would have helped avoid the hundreds of thousands of casualties suffered during the two-and-a-half-year siege. The poll caused outrage in Russia, and the television lost dozens of contracts with the largest Russian TV providers under pressure from the authorities. On 1 March, 2022, the Russian authorities completely blocked the Rain TV signal due to its critical attitude towards the invasion of Ukraine.

Another example of restricting freedom of speech was the rejection of Kirill Alexandrov’s doctorate. In his research, he described Red Army soldiers who went over to the Wehrmacht side, including the most famous of them — General Andrei Vlasov. The historian put forward the thesis that the mass desertions were caused by aversion to Stalinism and the USSR. This was met with the dissatisfaction of the scientific authorities in Russia. The doctorate was not recognised, as it did not contribute to the unity of society and lacked a patriotic message. Dozens of similar situations are taking place in Russia, depriving the public of access to more objective historical research and a critical look at the history of the state. This is reflected in the attitude of the Russians to World War II.

Putin podczas wiecu w Sewastopolu, 2018. kremlin.ru, CC BY-SA 4.0 — Putin during a rally in Sevastopol, 2018. kremlin.ru, CC BY-SA 4.0

Levada Center Research

The Levada Center, an independent public opinion research organisation, has been conducting analyses examining the attitude of Russians to their history for many years. In the 2020 survey, respondents were asked, among other things, about these issues. When asked what comes to mind first when they think of their nation, the most frequent answer was: “our past, our history”. This option has been gaining popularity in Russian society in recent years. Invariably, the victory in the Great Patriotic War remains in the first place among the events of which Russians are most proud (89%). On the other hand, what arouses the greatest shame is the collapse of the USSR, followed by poverty and chaos in the country, despite a strong society and state.

The results of the survey perfectly show how historical policy and social expectations are intertwined. Russian society needs the myth of the Great Patriotic War, because it gives a sense of agency and strength. The grief after the collapse of the USSR, which was at the peak of its power after World War II, causes people to look for legends and myths that will help restore the vision of great Russia. This is crucial in the context of how important defeating Nazism is for Russian society, which still sees itself as Hitler’s vanquishers. The authorities and Kremlin propaganda have been building the myth of the Great Patriotic War on this — Russia’s historical mission has never ended, and the war in Ukraine is its next stage.