This analysis was created in cooperation with analysts of the Slovak department of GLOBSEC and Hungarian Political Capital, with the support of the Open Information Partnership. We analysed the activities of pro-Russian anti-war movements in the information space of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. In this report, we describe the narratives and connections, present the most prominent activists, and explain how the Kremlin uses pacifist ideas to legitimise its armed aggression against Ukraine. We also show how the far right cooperates with left-wing organisations in spreading Russian propaganda.

When in March 2021 we revealed the links of the Russian propaganda apparatus to COVID-19-related disinformation, and we warned that the conspiracies could become breeding grounds for Kremlin-inspired false narratives (as it happened before in the U.S.), the reactions of the audience were rather subdued. This kind of information was seen as anti-Russian paranoia, and yet, as we demonstrated after the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine in February 2022, Polish “anti-covid” movements really quickly became anti-Ukrainian and anti-Western. Over the past two and a half years, a lot has been said and written about Kremlin-inspired disinformation. Agents have been exposed, GRU officers have been arrested, channels and methods of recruiting associates have been analysed, conferences have been organised, and podcasts have been created. At the same time, “anti-war” movements have been emerging in almost all of Europe, whose rhetoric and slogans, as well as the profiles of their leaders, seemed to have a universal character. We do not undertake a moral or political assessment of these organisations, and the purpose of our study was solely to describe the scale of their operations, the international nature of their activities, and their links with the narrative line of propaganda of the Russian Federation.

Findings

• Pro-Russian anti-war movements operate across the full spectrum of the European political scene: from ruling parties to opposition parties, to small political parties and social movements;
• Properly used anti-war rhetoric in some countries (such as Slovakia or Hungary) translates into electoral successes;
• Almost all identified anti-war movements had indirect or direct links with representatives of the Russian Federation;
• In all countries, a very similar set of narratives is used, each time based on the same propaganda core, expanded with narratives that fit into local conditions;
• Anti-war movements from the Visegrád Group (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic), Germany and, to a lesser extent, Bulgaria and Romania cooperate with each other, maintain close contacts, participate in each other’s events and promote each other;
• Left-wing and far-right movements cooperate without hindrance as long as they promote consistent pro-Russian narratives.

What are “anti-war” movements?

When writing about “anti-war movements”, we refer to Polish and foreign organisations and political parties that oppose supporting Ukraine in its defensive war with Russia and call for an immediate ceasefire, while sympathising with the Russian Federation. It should be noted that the pacifist idea itself, which is the basis of their activities, is undoubtedly right. However, a characteristic feature of the analysed anti-war movements is the use of pacifism to promote pro-Russian attitudes or goals that coincide with the Kremlin’s foreign policy.

Characteristic elements of pro-Russian anti-war rhetoric are:

• Creating a sense of danger in recipients;
• Appealing to emotions;
• Equating the aggressor’s guilt with the victim’s or falsely portraying the aggressor as the “real victim”;
• Expanding the pacifist message with anti-Western elements.

Groups and individuals using anti-war rhetoric often point out that the real origins of the conflict in Ukraine date back to the Revolution of Dignity of 2014, and that Ukraine itself is to blame for the war. Only the first part of this statement is true, because indeed in 2014, dissatisfied with the overthrow of the pro-Russian authorities, Russia made use of the chaos prevailing in Ukraine to annex Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine. Back then the Russians managed to achieve their goals. The situation in the region had been effectively destabilised for eight consecutive years until a full-scale invasion in February 2022.

Despite numerous conspiracy theories blaming the West for the orchestration of the Revolution of Dignity and alleged secret actions aimed at destabilising the Russian Federation, the fact remains that since 2014, Russia has twice invaded the territory of independent Ukraine, triggering the first war in Europe in the 21st century.

Anti-war movements alternately reject, ignore, or accept this fact, pointing to the need for an immediate end of the war, regardless of the causes. But this is where their unconditional pacifism ends because, in any narrative, the cost of peace is supposed to be Ukraine’s surrender of part of its territory to Russia and the fulfilment of a number of Russian demands. Unlike classical pacifist movements, pro-Russian anti-war organisations do not side with the victim, but in a more or less veiled manner support the aggressor.

The use of peace as a weapon

The use of pacifist ideas by the Russians is nothing new. Already in the late 1940s, the Soviet Union began building an international network of anti-war organisations by creating the Soviet Peace Committee. In 1948, the World Congress of Intellectuals in Defence of Peace was held in Wroclaw. In 1950, the Soviets established The World Peace Council which coordinated the activities of anti-war movements outside the USSR throughout the Cold War. All these initiatives had little to do with spontaneous pacifist actions, they were financed and centrally controlled by Moscow, with the goal of stigmatising any militaristic attitudes of the West while ignoring the analogous actions of the other side.

Eryk Lipiński, a brochure of the World Peace Council, 1951

From the very beginning, the main goal of the World Peace Council was to spread narratives supporting the Kremlin’s policies. In 1950, the Council issued the Stockholm Appeal, calling for a global ban on the production of nuclear weapons, and conducted a gigantic promotional campaign. According to some sources, it was signed by some 500 million people. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union was developing its own nuclear weapons. As it quickly turned out, the Appeal was nothing more than an attempt to slow down the construction of the Western nuclear potential, and the Soviets abandoned this project as soon as they created their own arsenal.

Moscow’s efforts to build, support, or simply exploit existing anti-war movements continued throughout the Cold War and continue to be an effective tool for supporting influence operations in Western countries.

War is bad, but…

Pacifist statements of anti-war movements (for example, the slogan used throughout the analysed area “Yes to Peace, NO to War”) always go hand in hand with a number of other catchphrases, most often of anti-Western nature or designed to cause fear in the audience. Not all of them were present in the information spaces of each of the four countries studied, but they proved to be popular and universal throughout the analysed region.

This is not our war

This popular phrase, first used in Poland by Rodacy Kamraci (Comrade Compatriots), seems to be the most universal, occurring in all the countries analysed, as well as in Germany (in the form of the hashtag #nichtunserkrieg).

PRA’s propaganda banner

Supported by slogans such as “No to aid for Ukraine” and “Let’s not go to this war”, it urges to stop supporting Ukraine in the war with Russia. According to this narrative, providing military support to fighting Ukraine is tantamount to the direct involvement of a helping country in the conflict, which can lead to war on its territory. Directly from this idea come other popular slogans, such as “Today our tanks, tomorrow our children” and “Families for peace” (the latter is used especially on marches, mainly in Slovakia and the Czech Republic.) Anti-war movements have been trying to convince the audience that the only way to avoid an open war between Europe and the United States with Russia is to immediately stop supporting Ukraine.

NATO go home!

The core element of the message of anti-war movements is anti-Western rhetoric. It is usually copied directly from Russian propaganda, which blames the West (sometimes quite justifiably) for geopolitical destabilisation in various regions of the world. Other popular slogans, such as “Stop Americanization” or “NATO go home”, refer mainly to the country’s political dependence on the United States.

PRA’s propaganda banner, stopamerykanizacji.pl

Anti-war movements seek to portray the United States as the actual occupier of Central and Eastern Europe, which by means of soft power and various forms of political, military and economic pressure is trying to turn Poland, Slovakia or Hungary into its vassals (or has already succeeded doing so). This narrative emphasises how much the United States gains in the region at the expense of smaller countries, but always ignores the fact that the benefits are usually mutual, and relations are based not only on economic dominance but also on strategic partnerships and alliances. The slogan “Let us not shed blood for the nefarious interests of politicians, banksters and corporations” is based on the assumption that the war in Ukraine from the very beginning serves primarily to enrich the Western elites. While some economic benefits to Western economies (resulting, for example, from increased arms production) seem obvious, this narrative overlooks the fact that it was not the West, but Russia that decided to start military operations and, above all, it is also Russia that can prevent such “shady interests” by ending the war.

Dividing Europe

One of the typical lines of pro-Russian narratives is undermining Western alliances. The promotion of nationalist attitudes and isolationist policies is a proven tool used by Russian propaganda in accordance with the philosophy of “Divide and Conquer”. A collective, unanimous European Union is a much bigger challenge for the Russian Federation than dozens of smaller economies. Anti-war movements very often refer to the concept of a “Europe of Nations”, which calls for increasing the autonomy of the member states of the European Union. Slogans such as “YES to Europe of Nations. NO to a European superstate” refer to an extreme vision of the federalisation of Europe, in which supposedly nation-states would disappear completely. This narrative is often intertwined with contradictory praise of Polexit, as the degree of anti-European radicalisation varies across the various coalitions of anti-war movements.

March for Peace organized by KWW Głos Silnej Polski, 1 May 2024, photo taken by Fakenews.pl’s analyst

Anti-war movements also take advantage of all local animosities and difficult history between the members of the European Union, as well as between member states and Ukraine, constantly referring, for example, to the Volhynian massacre or German crimes of World War II, raising the issues of Hungarian minorities in Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine or Polish minorities in Lithuania. However, they always fail to mention Russian crimes in their narratives.

Stop Ukrainization

This slogan appeared in the pro-Russian propaganda message almost immediately after the invasion began in 2022, initially finding no fertile ground due to the unprecedented scale of the mobilisation of European societies to provide aid to Ukrainian refugees. As time passed by and the war fatigue among citizens grew, the social support for Ukrainians staying in Poland began to weaken, and a similar situation can be expected in other countries of the European Union.

Cover of the brochure “Stop Ukrainization of Poland”, Konfederacja Korony Polskiej

Anti-war movements point to a series of alleged evidence that Ukrainians are gradually colonising their host countries, ultimately leading to the displacement of local culture and the transformation of Poles/Hungarians/Slovaks into second-class citizens. Support for refugees, social benefits, free public transport, the presence of Ukrainian flags in public spaces, and the possibility for Ukrainians to work and send their children to local schools are often cited as examples of “Ukrainization”. According to anti-war movements, local citizens are marginalised, and all privileges are provided only to Ukrainians, who, lured by the prospect of a comfortable life with European taxpayers’ money, are leaving Ukraine en masse. In addition to a comfortable life financed by social benefits, they also allegedly take away jobs from local residents, and their presence is expected to lead to an increase in crime. These narratives are universally used by disinformation circles against all immigrants, and in the case of Ukrainians, they are further reinforced by the element of alleged waste of taxpayers’ money to support a war that’s “not ours”.

Echoing the Kremlin’s popular propaganda line, anti-war movements regularly accuse all Ukrainians of Nazism. In fact, there were (and to some extents, still are) volunteer, far-right battalions in Ukraine that used Nazi rhetoric and symbolism. We already discussed this back in January 2023. Nonetheless, public support for this type of ideology is in fact marginal in Ukraine – in the parliamentary elections in 2019, a coalition of radical and ultra-nationalist parties, members of which belonged to the aforementioned battalions, achieved the result of 2.15% votes.

Polish anti-war movements

Numerous more or less formal organisations operating in Poland adopted anti-war and pro-Russian rhetoric. Some of them are niche, while some others can boast thousands (or even hundreds of thousands) of committed members and supporters. Noticeably, according to research, up to 98% of Poles may have a negative attitude towards Russia, which makes the activities of Polish pro-Russian anti-war movements particularly difficult. In this context, the scale of their activities and the degree of their professionalisation must be regarded as a significant achievement.

Below is a list of organisations that, since February 2022, have used narratives that coincide with the Kremlin’s propaganda line. While it cannot be stated with absolute certainty that these organisations or their members directly represent the interests of the Russian Federation, there is no doubt that they routinely use the same slogans and schemes as Russian news outlets and disseminate the same content within networks of similar groups and organisations in Central and Eastern Europe. The list also includes registered and informal organisations that are not active in the Internet space (often they operate only physically or as legal entities), but have been established by members of other groups spreading similar narratives.

While discussing the links between the Polish, Hungarian, Slovak and Czech anti-war movements, we limit ourselves to describing their activities only in recent years, particularly during the period after February 2022. The foundations for their activity have been laid at least for the last dozen years (in Poland by such people as Aleksander Usowski, Mateusz Piskorski, Nabil Malazi, or Eugeniusz Sendecki), but the purpose of this report is primarily to present the state of our current knowledge, analyse threats, and make predictions of the directions of development of the most popular anti-war movements.

With few exceptions, these organisations are nationalist and right-wing or far-right. However, in spreading anti-war narratives, they often willingly cooperate with left-wing formations, which is extremely rare in other spheres.

Polski Ruch Antywojenny (Polish Anti-War Movement)

The Polish Anti-War Movement (Polski Ruch Antywojenny, PRA) is an initiative of political scientist Leszek Sykulski and Sebastian Pitoń, an anti-covid activist and founder of the initiative Góralskie Veto (Mountaineer’s Veto). Both have become well known to the Polish public in recent years as the founders of the openly pro-Russian anti-war movement in early February 2023, which was the first such initiative after the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine. The PRA’s motto is “This is not our war”.

Source: PRA

PRA’s Manifesto precisely defines the narrative lines that the movement has been adhering to for more than a year.

The initiative was born from the bottom up from the ideological cooperation of Sebastian Pitoń and Leszek Sykulski, and deep disagreement on the internal and foreign policy pursued by the governments in Warsaw after 1999, as well as the adventurous policy aimed at confronting our neighbours and pursuing Washington’s strategic interests.

Since its foundation, the movement has promoted slogans such as “Stop Americanization of Poland“, “Stop Ukrainization of Poland”, or “Zero Enemies Among Neighbours”. The PRA’s activities relied primarily on the energy and media experience of Leszek Sykulski, who organised numerous marches, debates, conferences and meetings with activists of the movement throughout Poland. The PRA also organised a not-very-successful anti-war billboard campaign and effectively built its online presence. From the very beginning, the movement closely cooperated with Grzegorz Braun’s Konfederacja Korony Polskiej (KKP).

Source: Screenshot, Góralskie Veto/Facebook

Both before and after the founding of the PRA, Leszek Sykulski repeatedly gave statements in which he sympathised with Russia, boasted of photos with the Russian ambassador to Poland, and also met with Alexander Dugin, Dmitry Yegorchenko, or Andrei Popov (ex-FSB).

Source: Leszek Sykulski/Facebook

Source: Leszek Sykulski/Facebook

Source: Leszek Sykulski/Facebook

Source: Sykulski with Dugin, Leszek Sykulski/Facebook

The movement had been gaining other supporters until the split in May 2023, when Sebastian Pitoń broke off cooperation with Sykulski (officially due to his pro-Russian attitude and excessive political aspirations) and moved to the KKP, establishing cooperation with Grzegorz Braun. He quickly proved inconvenient for the party, which was trying to build a moderate image during the election campaign, and was not allowed to run in the parliamentary elections. The following year he tried his luck in the local elections for the position of wójt (an administrative officer of a Polish commune) of the Kościelisko commune, but did not win there either.

Source: Screenshot, Jerzy Andrzejewski/Facebook

Leszek Sykulski continued to lead the PRA. The movement made an attempt to run in the parliamentary elections, but the National Electoral Commission did not register its committee and notified the prosecutor’s office in connection with the suspicion of forgery on the lists of support of the committee.

Ultimately, the expansion of the PRA served primarily to create Leszek Sykulski’s flagship initiative, which preserved all elements of the PRA’s rhetoric, and enriched with a political aspect. Based on the programme, personnel and knowledge gained during the PRA era, Leszek Sykulski decided to fight for seats in the European Parliament by creating the Bezpieczna Polska (Safe Poland) political party.

Bezpieczna Polska (Safe Poland)

BP has completely replaced the PRA, compromised after the Pitoń affair and the scandal with the lists of support. Sykulski founded the BP with Piotr Panasiuk, a well-known pro-Russian publicist who ran for the Sejm in 2019 from the Confederation lists. Panasiuk was accused of espionage, and as a result, the party has been distancing from him since. The BP continued the PRA’s pro-Russian and anti-war mission and, despite its isolationist and extremely eurosceptic rhetoric, tried to get its members elected into the European Parliament.

After founding Bezpieczna Polska, Leszek Sykulski repeatedly stressed that the party is not pro-Russian and does not spread Kremlin propaganda. As he stated in an interview for Polsat News:

I have never advocated pro-Putin policies or spoken out against Ukraine. Saying that Poland should not support Ukraine is not anti-Ukrainian – it is pro-Polish. The normalisation of relations with Russia and Belarus is not pro-Russian.

It should be noted that, indeed, Leszek Sykulski himself is not a politician romantically interested in Russia, nor has anyone proved to him any financial ties with the Kremlin. Contrary to the claims of some commentators, there is no evidence that Sykulski wants to make Poland a Russian republic. However, he clearly sees the Republic of Poland deeply in the Russian sphere of influence, and he is certainly well aware of all the consequences. BP’s 51-page policy agenda very clearly defines the approach of the party and Sykulski himself to Ukraine, the Russian Federation, and the United States. After reading it, there is no doubt about the pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian nature of BP’s activities.

In BP’s political program, the word “Russia” appears 14 times, always in the context of cooperation, usually in the spheres of economy and energy. Belarus appears 15 times therein. According to Sykulski, Poland is to create energy bridges with Russia and Belarus, build nuclear power plants together, for example in Kaliningrad, obtain cheap gas from the East and energy from the Belarusian atom, and reject all Western sources of energy, especially renewable ones. The port of Gdańsk is to be opened to Belarus. Finally, Poland is to join the BRICS group and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, leave NATO and, in the case of further integration (“federalisation”) of the European Union, complete Polexit. In summary, the party assumes the replacement of all Polish dependence on the West with dependence on Russia and Belarus, while claiming that this is a way to achieve independence and a method of conducting a “multi-vector policy”.

Source: Screenshot, programme of the Bezpieczna Polska party

The United States appears in the programme eight times, usually in a negative character – as a hegemon that imposes numerous obligations on Poland in pursuit of its own benefits. Carbon taxes, “LGBT ideology”, and electric car production are explicitly described as an American plot to destabilise Poland. While Poland’s quite strong geopolitical dependence on the United States is a fact, any such relationship is portrayed by the BP as harmful to Poland’s national interest, while the same potential dependencies on Russia and Belarus are described as very beneficial.

Source: Screenshot, bezpieczna.org.pl

“Ukraine” appears in the document eight times, each time in a negative context. Despite the strong promotion of the slogan “Zero Enemies Among Neighbours”, Sykulski’s programme mentions Ukraine mainly in relation to difficult historical relations (genocide in Volhynia), nationalist attitudes (banderism), alleged institutional Nazism (copied from Russian propaganda), possible nuclear retaliation by Russia as a result of supporting Ukraine, or the alleged drainage by the Ukrainian army of the resources of the Polish Army.

Simultaneously, references to other neighbours of Poland are difficult to find in the document (except four general inserts about Germany and one, negative, about Lithuania), so it seems that the declaration was in fact hostile to Ukraine, criticism of which takes up almost as much space as the United States.

The programme repeatedly mentions the Ukrainian genocide, international law violations committed by the United States (tortures in secret CIA prisons), or even the discriminatory policy of the Lithuanian authorities towards Polish minorities, but there’s not a single word about Russian crimes against Poles.

The programme is focused mainly on the areas of Sykulski’s expertise, while issues like health care or education are described laconically and usually limited to generalities such as “extra financing”, “modernisation”, and “support”, without any specific solutions. For the most part, the programme is a collection of more or less fortunate ideas, not specifically attributable as a whole to any particular trend and giving the impression of a rather populist text (interestingly, Sykulski has long proposed a 0% housing loan).

A lot of space has been devoted to the ideological declaration, which can be described as nationalist and right-wing, with a certain “libertarian” accent in the style of the Confederacy. Identity, ethnic homogeneity, national interest and the power of the state are mentioned time and time again. Interestingly, these ideological principles are not fully consistent with the detailed assumptions of the programme. Most likely, the authors of the text realised that the majority of the party’s sympathisers would only read the first pages, and therefore most of the “hard” national narratives have been condensed there. The programme itself seems much more moderate.

In summary, the BP paints the image of the Republic of Poland as a strong and innovative country that, after breaking all dependence from the West, would enthusiastically move into the direct zone of influence of friendly Russia. Without “enemies among neighbours”, except Ukraine.

Activities and structures of Bezpieczna Polska

From the early stage of the new party’s creation, our analysts were present in its structures (from November 2023 until July 2024), accepted by Piotr Panasiuk himself. Neither the local coordinators nor Panasiuk himself effectively verified the identities of the new members. Already during the 3-month trial period, and without any in-person meetings, they were entrusted with coordinating the activities of local branches, received mailing lists and contacts, and were tasked with the collection of signatures on support lists. Unverified party members on a prolonged probationary period were also responsible for organising events and party congresses, during which Sykulski himself was present. Despite the many years of experience of members of the BP in managing various associations and movements, the level of organisation of this new party turned out to be rather amateur.

Larger events happened mainly due to individual determination rather than cooperation within the movement. Based on our experience, which was later confirmed by the subsequent statement by the BP, Piotr Panasiuk did not really do well as party secretary, new members waited for an answer on enrolment for weeks, and from February 2024 people did not receive any answers at all. Significant communication problems, delays in work and difficulties with collecting signatures occurred on a daily basis. The control of the authorities over the daily activities of the local committees was fictional – the committees operated with a high dose of autonomy, which resulted in a rapid expansion of structures, but also low efficiency of activities outside the capital.

After the unsuccessful run-off in the European Parliament elections, gloomy moods prevailed in the party structures, purges were carried out, and numerous smaller committees were closed. Several activists were removed, including Piotr Panasiuk, Jerzy Andrzejewski, Natalia Jabłońska, and Marian Konarski.

The BP released a statement saying:

We cut any and all ties with Piotr Panasiuk and his supporters in the authorities of the Bezpieczna Polska party (Marian Konarski, Natalia Jabłońska), and warn all activists and sympathisers of our party, the Polish Anti-War Movement and other organisations, to be wary of his activities. Mr Panasiuk faces serious accusations from the law enforcement authorities of the Polish state, which we did not know about before he joined the party. In addition, the prosecutor’s office recently received a notification of the commission of a crime by Mr Panasiuk under Art. 130 (cooperating with foreign intelligence). (…)
The audit of party correspondence also revealed serious omissions by Mr Panasiuk as party secretary, even threatening to liquidate the party (such as failing to provide any response to the letter of the National Electoral Commission). Since February this year, the secretary has not provided the National Executive Board with any personal data of applicants wishing to join the party, despite the incoming declarations of membership.

It seems that the accusations against Piotr Panasiuk of espionage and pro-Russian attitudes were primarily a good opportunity to get rid of him from the BP structures due to his extreme incompetence and failure to perform his duties. Marian Konarski addressed this issue by publishing his correspondence with Leszek Sykulski.

Source: Marian Konarski/Facebook

The current highest party officials are:

Leszek Sykulski – President
Paweł Budrewicz – Vice President
Bartosz Kaczmarek – Vice President
Mieczysław Konarski – Vice President
Dariusz Antkiewicz – Audit Committee
Łukasz Wojciechowski – Audit Committee
Krzysztof Weronowski – Audit Committee
Michał Krajewski – Party Court
Maciej Moc – Party Court
Adam Pucek – Party Court

One of BP leaders is Paweł Budrewicz – a divorce lawyer, and expert at the Adam Smith Center, who wrote for Wprost magazine and gave interviews in the mainstream media in the past. He is the president of the “Lubię Miasto” association, which uses its profile on X mainly to criticise the policies of Rafał Trzaskowski. Their Facebook page primarily shares articles from portalwarszawski.pl, a blog known for conservative content and criticising the ruling coalition, led by Daniel Echaust, whose activities during the rule of PiS were financed by PGE SA. The exact amounts have not been disclosed. The association also includes Jacek W. Bartyzel, a politician and publicist associated with Janusz Korwin-Mikke’s Nowa Nadzieja (New Hope Party) and Ordo Iuris. Together with Karolina Pawłowska, he sits on the Supervisory Board of the Arche Institute (Logos Europa), whose president is Tymoteusz Zych.

Currently, in addition to publishing more or less conspiratorial content on his Facebook and X profiles, Budrewicz is responsible for legal matters related to BP’s activities and is undoubtedly one of the most substantive people in the organisation.

Source: Paweł Budrewicz/X

He was present at the march on 1 May, and spoke fluently, although he did not win the crowd, probably because of the less radical nature of his speech (compared to those speaking before him), especially because of his clear aversion to the idea of hard Polexit. Leszek Sykulski praised Budrewicz several times from the stage.

Paweł Budrewicz speaks at the Peace March, 1 May 2024, photo taken by Fakenews.pl’s analyst

By June 2024, one of the highest officials in the party was Mariusz Świder, a writer and historian specialising, among others, in the history of Russia. He is the treasurer of the Patria association, on the audit committee of which sits Nabil Malazi, associated with Wojciech Olszański. Malazi is a nestor of many organisations disseminating propaganda of the Kremlin in Poland, who together with Mateusz Piskorski and Eugeniusz Sendecki laid the foundations for Polish pro-Russian movements.

Mariusz Świder in the Russian-friendly program of Maciej Poręba; Source: Screenshot

Mariusz Świder together with Piotr Panasiuk also visited Moscow, taking part in the “Multipolarity Forum”, during which Panasiuk managed to talk to Alexander Dugin and deliver greetings sent by Leszek Sykulski.

Source: Piotr Panasiuk/X

The vice president of the BP is Bartosz Kaczmarek, who only in 2016 was the head of the SLD structures in Poznań and was described by his colleagues as a man “faithful to left-wing beliefs”. However, he quickly became known as a staunch opponent of immigration and a strong supporter of Putin’s Russia. In 2018, he was kicked out of the SLD and after a short cooperation with Jarosław Puck, in 2020 he found a place in the ranks of the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO), where he was not welcome from the beginning. In 2023, he engaged in the activities of the KKP in Poznań, however, the party did not appreciate his actions (the organisation of a march competing with the initiative of the Nowa Nadzieja party on 11 November), which led to the rapid dissolution of local structures to get rid of Kaczmarek. His wanderings ended in the BP board, which seems best suited to his political convictions.

There is no doubt that among BP authorities are people with an extremely interesting and often complicated past. Such a melange of activists from very different backgrounds allowed the BP to develop its ambitions and create the largest political initiative of pro-Russian circles in the history of the Third Polish Republic – Głos Silnej Polski (the Voice of a Strong Poland).

Głos Silnej Polski (the Voice of a Strong Poland)

The electoral committee Głos Silnej Polski (GSP) was established in March 2024. Formed by activists of the BP, the Front party, and the Watahy Głosu Obywatelskiego (Civic Voice Packs), it ran in the European Parliament elections, finishing last with 0.02% of the votes. The result is certainly not impressive, but it should be noted that, unlike more than 15 other niche far-right and eurosceptic movements, the GSP managed to field several candidates.

Source: Screenshot, GSP

Despite much higher aspirations, the GSP started only in District 5 (the Mazovia region excluding Warsaw), gaining 2,167 votes, primarily in Przysucha (west of Radom), Mińsk Mazowiecki and Radom counties. The reason for such an unusual distribution of votes is primarily the fact that the most recognisable candidates ran there. Many GSP voters live in eastern and southern Poland, so those most motivated to vote commuted to the borders of District 5 in order to cast their votes there. The lists of the GSP took into account the regional specificity and popularity of specific candidates in a given district. For this reason, in the end, only one prominent activist of the committee (Andrzej Poneta, Wataha Głosu Obywatelskiego) ran in the European Parliament elections. Leszek Sykulski and Krzysztof Tołwiński did not gain enough support in their districts.

Ultimately, the following candidates ran in the elections in District 5 from the list of the GSP electoral committee (order as per the list):

Andrzej Poneta (second result)
Grzegorz Lechowski (best result)
Łukasz Gorączyński
Marcin Kaczor
Zbigniew Zarecki
Joanna Madej
Wanda Wojciechowska
Magdalena Orzechowska
Agnieszka Pastuszka

The Belarusian Front

The Front party is small and its permanent structures are limited to operations in eastern Poland. It represents the rural electorate of the GSP and pursues a policy similar to the BP, with a particular focus on matters related to agriculture and food production. It promotes cooperation with neighbouring Belarus.

Source: Front

Front’s Leader, Krzysztof Tołwiński, is a politician, former member of the Sejm, farmer, forester and entrepreneur from Podlasie, emphasising his noble origin. In addition to his political activities as the leader of the Front, he is engaged in dairy cow breeding, as well as organising events and producing rural food. He calls himself a “gospodarz” (i.e. one who owns and cultivates land). At the beginning of his career, he was a member of the PSL, the wójt of the Dziadkowice commune, sat in the Podlaskie regional assembly, and also became a deputy marshal of the Podlaskie Voivodeship at that time. He gained much publicity when his unusual relationship with a subordinate was revealed, and he openly admitted having two different life partners.

After many years with the PSL, he decided to side with the Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS). As a result, he quickly lost his position. At that moment in time, local media predicted the end of his career, listing his alleged abuses and physical assaults on his workers. Finally, Tołwiński briefly held the position of Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of State Treasury in the government of Jarosław Kaczyński. In 2010, he officially joined PiS and became a member of the Sejm of the 6th term. He ran for the Sejm several more times, including from the lists of Kukiz’15 and the Confederation. Disappointed by the failures and dependence on politicians of other parties, he founded the Front in 2023.

Krzysztof Tołwiński has long maintained friendly relations with the Russian Embassy in Poland and with the authorities of the Grodno region in Belarus. Between 21 and 24 August, representatives of the Front party went to Belarus. Front signed a cooperation agreement with the Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus. Both parties will implement a joint project focused on shaping the vision of a Europe of Nations, the security of which is to be guaranteed by the Russian Federation. The project will also include parties from Slovakia, Germany, Italy, Austria, and France.

According to Tołwiński, the Front together with Bezpieczna Polska, will appeal to Viktor Orbán to facilitate Polish-Belarusian mediation.

Krzysztof Tołwiński visits the Russian ambassador; Source: Screenshot, Krzysztof Tołwiński/Facebook

Wataha Głosu Obywatelskiego (The Wolfpack of the Civic Voice)

Frustrated with the restrictions during the pandemic, Andrzej Poneta created an online channel aimed at those opposed to vaccinations and the obligation to wear masks. “Głos Obywatelski” (the Civic Voice) grew in strength and gained more and more supporters, which led to transforming it into an efficient social movement. Local cells of the informal organisation brought together people who considered themselves particularly free and independent due to the selective rejection of government regulations and restrictions.

Source: Screenshot, WGO webpage

A howling wolf was adopted as a symbol, and the members began to call themselves “watahy” (wolfpacks). Within the umbrella unit called Wataha Głosu Obywatelskiego (WGO), there are many smaller packs that organise various events, marches, lectures, and meetings. The WGO is guided by nationalist and conservative ideology, its members are eurosceptic and tend to disseminate conspiracy narratives. They oppose sex education in schools, cashless payments, EU regulations, and WHO recommendations. They cooperate with such channels and platforms as wRealu24, emisjaTV, or BanBye.

Source: Screenshot, WGO

The WGO is the most active organisation within the GSP, and it also has the most supporters. It regularly organises events throughout the country and publishes an online newsletter called “Echo Watahy Głosu Obywatelskiego” (Echo or the Civic Voice Wolfpack). In the end, it was the WGO activists who got the best results in the European Parliament elections.

Marsz Pokoju (March for Peace)

Even before the establishment of Bezpieczna Polska, Leszek Sykulski and the PRA movement organised the first March for Peace (Marsz Pokoju). Similar marches were organised by the PRA, the BP, and finally the GSP several times, including in Lublin.

March for Peace in Lublin; Source: Screenshot, Lublin 112

On 1 May 2024, another March for Peace was organised in Warsaw, which passed from the Traugutt’s Cross to the statue of the Little Insurrectionist. The event, which was also attended by our analysts, was an opportunity for political agitation, during which signatures were collected on the list of support of the committee in District 5, leaflets and pins were handed out, and magazines were sold. The March was applauded by the Russian media.

The event gathered several hundred people, including many supporters of the WGO. It began and ended with a series of speeches by the GSP activists. Representatives of several smaller social movements, including Polski Ruch Lewicowy (the Polish Left Movement), also gave speeches in front of the statue of the Little Insurrectionist. During the event, almost all the slogans of the PRA were promoted, NATO and the United States were criticised, Polexit was called for, and the genocide in Volhynia was brought up. The following slogans were particularly successful:

“This is not our war”
“Do not move the capital to Kiev”
“Stop Ukrainization of Poland”
“Free Palestine”
“Stop Americanization of Poland”

An important element of the March was also the solidarity action with Palestine. Many Palestinian flags flew next to Polish flags. During similar events, the BP has repeatedly used the Palestinian issue and pro-Palestinian activists to promote anti-American rhetoric. There should be no illusions that the BP especially cares about the freedom of the Palestinians, who, as Arabs, are not generally perceived positively in the circles associated with the GSP. Support for Palestine in this case probably serves mainly as a good excuse to criticise Israel and, indirectly, the U.S.

The GSP activists showed great efficiency in organising events in Poland, but they were not particularly involved in foreign anti-war activities.

Konfederacja Korony Polskiej (Confederation of The Polish Crown)

In Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość party (the Confederation of Freedom and Independence), finding activists (and even MPs) with pro-Russian and anti-Ukrainian views is very easy. However, those particularly involved in the activities of anti-war movements are primarily members and sympathisers of the Confederation of the Polish Crown (Konfederacja Korony Polski, KKP). Its leader, Grzegorz Braun, is well known to all who are at least a little interested in politics, both in Poland and abroad. Braun recently gained significant publicity after using a fire extinguisher to put out Hanukkah candles in the Sejm.

He has repeatedly expressed sympathy for Russia while criticising the Polish government’s policy towards Ukraine. Since the beginning of the conflict, he has opposed supporting Ukraine in the conflict with Russia, which he (like Leszek Sykulski) considers “dragging Poland into the war”. In his speeches, he also suggested that Ukraine poses a threat to Poland, and questioned the sense of humanitarian and military aid provided to Ukrainians by the Polish authorities. In addition, Braun often questions the effectiveness of the sanctions imposed on Russia after its aggression in Ukraine, pointing out that they are harmful to the Polish economy. Also, he routinely intertwines the issues of Ukraine and Russia with various, usually anti-Western, conspiracy theories.

The “Stop Ukrainization of Poland” conference organised by the KKP; Source: Screenshot, Janusz Jaskółka.

Since the beginning of the full-scale war in 2022, Braun has advocated for peace, understood as concessions to Russia and fulfilment of a number of its demands by Ukraine. He has repeatedly been involved in anti-war speeches, and yet it is not him, but the vice-president of the KKP who plays a key role in the integration of anti-war circles in the Visegrád Group.

Roman Fritz

Roman Fritz is a politician, entrepreneur, and Member of Parliament. As vice-president of the KKP, he heads the international cooperation of the organisation. He is associated with the environment of the “Polonia Christiana” magazine. On behalf of the KKP, Roman Fritz participates in numerous events promoting pro-Russian policies and often organises them himself (for more examples, see the section on the links of anti-war movements.)

Roman Fritz at the press conference “Europe for Peace!”, surrounded by activists of anti-war movements from the V4 group; Source: Screenshot, KKP/Facebook

On 19 February 2024, Fritz participated in the conference “Should the EU be enlarged” in Prague. It was organised by the Geopolitika Foundation, whose president is Milutin Miša Ilić, a vocal critic of NATO who believes that Serbia should maintain good bilateral relations with both Ukraine and Russia, not succumb to pressure to choose either side and refrain from any pro-Ukrainian activity.

On 23 October 2023, Fritz took part in the celebrations of the 67th anniversary of the Hungarian Uprising in Budapest. In his speech, he opposed the “dictates” of any supranational organisations (EU, NATO). He blamed Western banks and alliances for the COVID-19 pandemic, global warming, the demoralisation of children, the migrant crisis, and the war in Ukraine. He spoke about the war using one of the PRA slogans:

Let’s not go to this war. Let us do everything to start peace negotiations as soon as possible!

The event was organised by a far-right party Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland), supporting the partition of Ukraine and the annexation of Transcarpathia to Hungary.

On 1 June 2024, Fritz participated in a demonstration in Prague organised by Ladislav Vrabel, whom the Czech media call a “pro-Russian disinformation agent”. The demonstrators protested against the war in Ukraine and demanded the withdrawal of the Czech Republic from NATO. Vrabel also organised a demonstration on 3 September, during which slogans were chanted against Ukrainian refugees, and the participants protested against handing Czech weapons over to Ukraine.

Anti-war movements in Hungary

Hungarian anti-war movements linked to the Russians have as long a history as similar organisations formed in Poland. Within the framework of the broadly understood Soviet peace movement, the Hungarian National Peace Council operated under the auspices of the Patriotic People’s Front (Hazafias Népfront, HNF) in the years 1950-1984. The organisation lost its significance in the 1980s but continued to operate in a limited form until 1992. Currently, there is no current information about its activities, but it is still listed as a member on the website of the World Peace Council.

At first glance, contemporary Hungarian anti-war movements such as the Hungarian Peace Circle, like their Polish counterparts, seem to advocate for important social issues such as conflict resolution, support for the sovereignty of states, or equality in international relations. However, a detailed analysis of their narratives shows that they support Russian geopolitical ambitions and propaganda, or undertake operations aimed at exerting a harmful influence on Hungarian national actors or other EU and NATO member states. Following the example of their predecessors during the Cold War, they proclaim slogans of universal peace and equality, while praising Russia and China, and criticising the West. Their activities became particularly visible in Hungary after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the start of a full-scale war in 2022. In concert with other pro-Russian movements, NGOs, parties, or media outlets, both at the international and regional level, anti-war movements have begun to support ceasefire proposals or disseminate seemingly peaceful narratives. While doing so, they also blame the West and Ukraine for the continuation or escalation of the conflict, thus supporting Kremlin propaganda and increasingly playing the card of “European societies being tired of the Ukrainian case”. In 2022, anti-war and pro-Russian narratives became part of the political mainstream in Hungary, promoted by the ruling Fidesz-KDNP coalition, which portrayed the Hungarian opposition during the general elections of the same year as “warmongers”.

Without a doubt, the Hungarian government and Fidesz-KDNP are the strongest anti-war movements in Hungary and the main opponents of support for Ukraine. In this analysis, we briefly describe the narratives of Fidesz, but our primary area of focus are smaller independent movements that build their structures from the bottom up.

From left to right

After the change of the political system, the democratic history of the Hungarian peace movements can be divided into three periods. Between 1990 and 2010, the peace movement was mainly represented by the far left. Between 2010 and 2022, the movements were dominated by Kremlin left-wing organisations led by the Workers’ Party and the Hungarian Social Forum. The current organisation and direction of development of Hungarian anti-war movements was marked by the annexation of Crimea in 2014. In the same year, Endre Simó, co-founder of the Hungarian Social Forum, created the Hungarian Peace Circle to promote Russian and Chinese interests. After the outbreak of war in 2022, opposition to involvement in the conflict became a key communication point and the foundation of the Fidesz-KDNP agenda in the political mainstream. This allowed the ruling parties to portray the democratic opposition as pro-war during the 2022 elections.

Meanwhile, false-hearted anti-war movements appeared on both the extreme left and the extreme right, the latter being represented primarily by the Our Homeland movement, the position of which was difficult to distinguish from the government’s anti-war narratives, except for a clear revisionism that assumes “Transcarpathia to return” to Hungary as a result of open war.

The main actor among the anti-war far-left became the Forum for Peace, founded by the Hungarian Peace Circle and the Hungarian Workers’ Party in September 2022. From the very beginning, it promoted Russia’s claims and accusations against the West, calling on the Hungarian government to take a neutral position in the conflict, and demanding the withdrawal of “foreign troops” violating Hungary’s sovereignty, including NATO units. The far-left movement linked with the Peace Circle also replicates the anti-Israeli, partly anti-Semitic narratives regarding the Gaza war that have also been used by Western left-wing peace movements. Hungarian anti-war leftist movements have criticised Hungary’s support for Israel, calling Israel’s actions against the Palestinians genocide and accusing the West of complicity. At the same time, the same organisations portray Russia and China as advocates of peace within the UN. Political Capital performed an analysis of the network of the far left’s links, which has shown that the umbrella organisation “Forum for Peace” successfully connects – directly through contacts and activists, or indirectly through organised events – organisations of the far right, such as Lelkiismeret ’88, and the far left, such as the Anti-Fascist League. Foreign contacts of the Forum for Peace mainly include international communist movements and events, such as the 23rd International Meeting of Communists and Workers’ Parties held in Izmir, Turkey in 2023.

Ultimately, the compact national network of Hungarian anti-war movements consists of formations with extreme views, both left and right. Such links include personal and organisational contacts, sharing news, participating in or co-organising “peaceful demonstrations”, and staying in close contact with the Russian Embassy. However, what distinguishes far-right and left-wing actors is the nature of their cooperation: right-wing entities cooperate in the arrangement of events and support each other, while left-wing ones have formed a separate umbrella organisation under the aegis of which they act.

Both far-left and far-right narratives share the mainstream view of Hungarian anti-war narratives, blaming the West and Ukraine for the outbreak of war, while downplaying Russia’s role as the aggressor, albeit with some subtle differences. Both also share the same anti-establishment view rooted in the far-left’s rejection of “Western imperialism” or the far-right’s defence of “national sovereignty”, which allows them to effectively work together for “peace”.

Hungarian anti-war movements after 2010

The current organisation and development of Hungarian peace movements has been fundamentally influenced by the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Between 2014 and 2022, the peace movement was represented mainly by left-wing micro-organisations linked to the Kremlin, led by the Workers’ Party and the Hungarian Social Forum. In 2014, Simó Endre, a founding member of the Hungarian Social Forum, created the Hungarian Peace Circle (Magyar Békekör), most likely to promote Russian and Chinese interests. The organisation’s website legitimised the annexation and warned Hungary against getting involved in the war. This anti-war rhetoric was quickly adopted by Fidesz-KDNP, allowing it to portray the opposition as warmongers. In addition, by emphasising the alleged aggression of the West against Russia, the authorities were able to maintain and legitimise close diplomatic and economic relations between Hungary and Russia, even after the outbreak of war in 2022. This led to the initial polarization of the Hungarian anti-war movement, with far-left actors on one side and the far-right Our Homeland movement (Mi Hazánk Mozgalom), which presented its own “peace proposal”, on the other.

Based on the available data, the Hungarian national anti-war movements can be divided into three groups: the mainstream political movement represented by Fidesz-KDNP and its satellite organisations, the far-left movements, and the far-right movements. The interrelationships between these organisations and parties include not only personal and organisational relations but also a common information policy, participation in or organisation of “peaceful demonstrations,” and maintaining close contacts with the Russian Embassy.

In this Hungarian network of non-governmental anti-war movements, two actors play a central or pivotal role: the Forum for Peace, which mainly brings together left-wing organisations, and the far-right Our Homeland movement, as well as two pro-Russian bodies, Bal-Rad and the Russian Carpathian Blog (Ruszin Kárpátalja).

The Hungarian government’s anti-war propaganda line

After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the government’s initial communication strategy was rather chaotic. Officials, pro-government experts and influencers have regularly claimed that Moscow would never commit such aggression. Consequently, the government-controlled public broadcaster and pro-government media reported the war from two extremely different perspectives. On the one hand, they published authentic reports depicting Russia as the aggressor and detailing war crimes committed by the Russian army. On the other hand, they allowed pro-government experts and lower-ranking Fidesz politicians to disseminate pro-Kremlin narratives and belittle Russia’s responsibility for the conflict. When former opposition prime minister candidate Péter Márki-Zay told independent media in late February 2022 that he would back up NATO’s decision to support Ukraine, the ruling party and its media distorted his statement, claiming that the opposition wanted to drag Hungary into war, which undoubtedly helped Fidesz-KDNP secure the final victory in the parliamentary elections.

Viktor Orbán using the slogan “This is not our war”; Source: VTV Makoi/YouTube

During the European Parliament election campaign, the government’s “peace narrative” went one step further, portraying Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz-KDNP party as the only politicians opposed to Hungary joining the war. Their main message, i.e. “Europe’s pro-war politicians want to start the third World War”, turned the election into a literal choice between life and death for many citizens. Fidesz politicians claimed that the “pro-war left” and most Western countries wanted to draw Europe into the Russian-Ukrainian war by sending weapons and then their own troops to help Ukraine. Fidesz presented itself as the only pro-peace party in favour of a ceasefire and peace talks. The key European politicians named in this narrative were Ursula von der Leyen, Emmanuel Macron, Donald Tusk, Olaf Scholz, and Manfred Weber, which corresponds to the “lists of shame” of almost all anti-war movements in the geographical area covered by the analysis.

The new Hungarian system with autocratic characteristics established after 2010 tries to legitimise its power through street demonstrations known as “peace marches”. The first peace march, which gathered hundreds of thousands of people, took place in 2012 during the first clashes between the European Union and the Hungarian government over the controversial transformation of the constitutional order. The march was intended to defend Hungarian “sovereignty” and “peaceful democracy” against foreign powers and domestic opposition. On 1 June 2024, the 10th peace march took place. This time, anti-war slogans were used to strengthen the support for Fidesz-KDNP just before the European and local elections. The event also became an opportunity for smaller anti-war movements to present themselves to a wider audience.

Forum for Peace

In September 2022, on the initiative of Endre Simó, president of the Hungarian Peace Circle, and Gyula Thürmer, president of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, the “Forum for Peace” movement was created. Its goal is “to regularly respond with political statements and actions to events that threaten the peace and security of our country”. Furthermore, the movement recognised Russia’s claims against the West, called on the Hungarian government to adopt a “neutral” (pro-Russian) position in the conflict, and demanded the withdrawal of “foreign troops” from Hungarian territory, including NATO units. In addition to the two founding organisations, the movement has four other members: Jogállamért Egyesület (Association for the Rule of Law), the far-right Lelkiismeret ’88 (Conscience ’88), Honfoglalás 2000 Egyesület, which previously organised pro-Russian protests, and Hajrá Magyarok a Szebb jövőnkért egyesület (Association of Hungarians for a Better Future).

Forum for Peace logo

To tap into the narratives of Hungary’s mainstream anti-war movement, Forum for Peace issued a special statement acknowledging the peace march organised by Fidesz-KDNP on 1 July, 2024. The activists noted that, unlike the Hungarian government, NATO and EU allies are “pro-war”, and stressed the need to establish a new European security system that will recognise Russia’s security demands.

Forum for Peace – links

An analysis of connections of the Forum for Peace movement showed that its members represent far-right and far-left political options, and proved their cooperation with Hungarian pro-Russian publicists and online media, as well as with international left-wing and right-wing anti-war movements.

The Workers’ Party, represented by its chairman Gyula Thürmer, maintains close ties with the left from Russia and China and participates in national and international communist events. These included, among others, the International Party Meeting held at the headquarters of the Workers’ Party in Budapest in March 2024, or Gyula Thürmer’s participation in the celebration honouring Russian “Defenders Of The Fatherland“, organised by the Russian embassy in February 2024.

Another important event was the 23rd International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties held in Izmir, Turkey in October 2023. The parties involved have issued statements calling for an intensification of “fight against NATO“, and called for organising “common mobilisation against Israeli aggression around the world”.

As the leader of the Hungarian Peace Circle and the founder of the Forum for Peace, Endre Simó primarily builds contacts that support Russian interests. An example of such activity is a lecture on Ukraine and the new European status quo delivered by the Russian ambassador at the Forum in October 2023. Simó also participated in two peace forums in Austria, where he demanded that “Hungary should not be drawn into the war, should pursue an active policy of neutrality and, together with Austria, refrain from adding oil to the fire”. According to an analysis conducted by the fact-checking portal Lakmuszruch, the Forum for Peace is also linked to the national pro-Russian internet environment through the Hungarian Peace Circle.

Anti-war protest in Budapest; Source: Forum for Peace/Facebook

The Forum for Peace organised two anti-war protests in Budapest. During the event on 26 July 2023, the organisers, in a joint statement, blamed Ukraine and the West for provoking the conflict:

Peace in our country is under threat. Our Western allies, in cooperation with domestic political and military circles, want to force us to fight on the side of Ukraine against Russia. They are blackmailing us, interfering in our internal affairs, contemplating a coup d’état, and seeking to install a puppet government in place of the legitimate one. They want us to abandon our pro-peace policies, send weapons and troops to Ukraine, and once again wage war with Russia, this time as part of NATO.

A similar event with the identical message was organised in March 2024. The first demonstration, organised by the Forum for Peace, was attended by both far-right and far-left formations. It showed that left-wing and right-wing anti-war movements can work perfectly together when they have a common goal and that the Kremlin has successfully infiltrated Hungarian extremist movements and micro-organisations across the whole of the Hungarian political spectrum. Such formations include the aforementioned far-right Lelkiismeret ’88, one of whose members was previously accused of plotting a terrorist act, the Hungarian Anti-Fascist League, which seemingly rejects far-right extremism, and the World Federation of Hungarians, which represents the interests of Hungarian minorities living abroad. Although such cooperation seems unfathomable, our analysis has shown that ideologically opposing movements can be successfully integrated under the philosophy of “East vs West “or “victim vs aggressor”. The Russian-Ukrainian war can be interpreted either as a nationalist project of Greater Russia opposing Western military aggression and liberating the Russian minority or as an effort against Western imperialism based on left-wing egalitarian values and aimed at restoring social justice in the “liberated” territories.

Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland)

On the far right, the pro-Russian “peace” narrative is represented by Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland), a movement that has occupied the space vacated by the de-radicalised Jobbik party (now positioning itself as a centrist party with right-wing inclinations). In his speech of March 2023, the leader of the movement, László Toroczkai, said that in the name of peace, Ukraine “must give up its territories”.

On 15 March 2024, during a “peaceful” protest in Budapest, organised on a national holiday commemorating the 1848-49 revolution, Toroczkai called on the Hungarian government to veto Sweden and Finland’s accession in the North Atlantic alliance, and opposed “NATO expansion” arguing that it poses a threat to the European order. As he admitted, the long-term objective of the movement is neutral Hungary, similar to Austria, focused solely on Hungarian interests.

László Toroczkai speaks at an anti-war rally; Source: Screenshot, Mi Hazánk website

In March 2024, in cooperation with the German far-right AfD, the Our Homeland movement organised another anti-war protest in Budapest in order to “prevent the Third World War“. The event highlighted the difficulties the movement faces in trying to distinguish its narrative from the official line of the Hungarian government. To emphasise the more radical stance of his movement, Toroczkai confirmed that he would support the revision of borders under certain conditions. He said: “If the statehood of Ukraine ceases as a result of the war, we, as the only party in Hungary, will demand Transcarpathia”. If we analyse the relations of Our Homeland, it becomes obvious that the party is indirectly connected with the Forum for Peace movement – the World Federation of Hungarians participated in demonstrations organised by the Forum for Peace, including the aforementioned event that took place on 15 March.

Hungarian voice in “The Voice of Europe”

According to Czech counterintelligence, a complex network of Russian propagandists has long been operating in the European Union to slow aid to Ukraine. This operation, supported by Russian intelligence, included, among other things, The Voice of Europe website, which published anti-Ukrainian content, as well as declarations of pro-Kremlin politicians. Russia financed certain European politicians who collaborated with this portal, and in some cases, the money was used to fund their campaigns ahead of the European Parliament elections in June. The site was backed by Viktor Medvedchuk, a Ukrainian opposition politician and oligarch living in Moscow, who is considered a close associate of Vladimir Putin. After the scandal broke, the Czech government placed The Voice of Europe operators on a national list of persons subject to sanctions against Russia.

Potential links between the Russian operation and the Hungarian anti-war movements are twofold. Firstly, The Voice of Europe was active in Austria, where its team recorded footage during “The International Peace Summit for Ukraine” held in Vienna in June 2023, attended by Endre Simó, the leader of the Peace Circle. Secondly, the Visegrád Post, run by Ferenc Almássy since 2010, has also been investigated by intelligence agencies for being part of the wider network built around The Voice of Europe. Almássy, who moved to Budapest at the age of 22, has long had links to far-right groups, including Jobbik and neo-Nazi Pax Hungarica, as well as to Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. Another important figure in the scandal is Nicolas de Lamberterie, linked to Almássy and listed among the authors of the Visegrád Post. He has been involved in the activities of the Hungarian far right since the mid-2000s when he was the leader of the French chapter of The Sixty-Four Countries Youth Movement. The movement was founded and for years led by László Toroczkai, the current leader of Mi Hazánk.

Despite Simó’s participation in the peace summit in Austria, or the fact that Almássy and Lamberterie have clearly had links to the Hungarian far-right movements, according to hvg.hu, there is no evidence that the Hungarian Peace Circle or Our Homeland received any money from foreign entities in order to conduct influence operations. However, The Voice of Europe scandal highlighted the Kremlin’s extensive and long-lasting influence on the organisations that formed the core of Hungary’s peace movements. It is extremely difficult to prove the financial connections of this type of organisation without the tools reserved for state institutions, but the correlations of narratives and personal connections leave no doubt about the nature of the activities of Hungarian anti-war movements.

Hungarian anti-war movements online

As one of the main pro-Russian sites on the Hungarian Internet, Bal-Rad describes itself as a “nationalist radical-left news portal” and regularly publishes news on and appeals of the Hungarian Peace Circle. The Russian Communist Party and the Ukrainian Communist Party are listed as partner organisations on the main page of the portal.

Bal-Rad logo

According to propaganda disseminated by Bal-Rad:

The peace of our country is under threat. Our Western allies, in cooperation with national political and military circles, want to force us to fight on the side of Ukraine against Russia. They are blackmailing us, interfering in our internal affairs, contemplating a coup d’état, and seeking to install a puppet government in place of the legitimate one. They want us to abandon our pro-peace policy, send weapons and troops to Ukraine, and go to war against Russia again, this time as part of NATO.

Another pro-Russian website connecting different movements is the Russian Carpathian Blog, which in 2023 reported on the demonstration against the parliamentary vote on Finland’s accession to NATO, rejecting “the senseless provocation from NATO that could lead to a World War”. The demonstration was attended by, among others, the far-right paramilitary Magyar Önvédelmi Mozgalom (Hungarian Self-Defence Movement), Magyar Békekör (the Hungarian Peace Circle), and anti-vaccine activists. The most distinctive feature of pro-Russian websites publishing in Hungarian is that they quote statements from the Hungarian Peace Circle, which includes Orosz Hírek (Russian News), one of the most important pro-Russian sources in Hungary. These media outlets are linked to even more radical sites promoting Russian or Hungarian revisionism (e.g. Friends of Russia, Russia | Россия, NOVOROSSIJA; Let Carpathia be Hungarian land again, Let’s remove the Szekler flag.)

Anti-war movements in Slovakia and selected organisations in the Czech Republic

Similarly to the situation in Hungary, anti-war narratives in Slovakia are often of an official nature, linked to the activities of politicians of the ruling parties. Slovak members of parliament frequently took advantage of pro-Russian narratives to build their political capital, which polarised the political scene of Slovakia much more than it did in the case of Poland or Hungary.

An illustration presenting the pro-Russian discourse of Slovak MPs before and after the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022. Source: Lintner, T., Diviák, T., Nekardová, B. et al. Slovak MPs’ response to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine in light of conspiracy theories and the polarisation of political discourse. Humanit Soc Sci Commun 10, 758 (2023). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-023-02276-8id

Below, we briefly discuss the lesser-known Slovak anti-war movements and their international connections, as they are more susceptible to the direct influence of the Russian Federation, and because of their well-established cooperation with similar organisations in the Visegrád Group.

Anti-war demonstrations in Slovakia were promoted and co-organised mainly by active and former members of Slovenské Hnuté Obrody (Slovak Revival Movement, SHO) primarily in 2023, with the exception of demonstrations promoted by Katarína Boková of Matky za Mier (Mothers for Peace) organisation. The main rhetoric of the movements included anti-Ukrainian, anti-EU and anti-American narratives, as well as opposition to international organisations such as the EU, NATO and WHO, and to sending weapons to Ukraine. Currently, Slovak links to anti-war movements in Central and Eastern Europe mainly involve members of SHO, Kotlebovci, and pro-Russian organisations and individuals such as Eduard Chmelár, Brat za Brata (Brother for Brother), or Katarína Boková. Links with Polish and Czech movements remain the domain of far-right political parties such as the SNS and Republika with the Polish Konfederacja and the Czech SPD, which met during demonstrations in Prague before the European Parliament elections.

Slovak Revival Movement and Mothers for Peace

SHO is a political party cooperating with the well-known cultural institution Matica Slovenská. After analysing SHO’s bimonthly Právo národa (The Right of the Nation), the pro-Russian activities of the party become clearly visible. The magazine is eurosceptic, favours Slovakia leaving NATO, and promotes extreme conspiracy theories, including those about American-Jewish world domination. What is more, SHO has been disseminating anti-vaccine narratives for a long time. Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the party focused mainly on fighting migration and lobbying against vaccines and restrictions.

Articles on the SHO website exaggerate or completely fabricate alleged threats from Western Europe, criticise multiculturalism, globalisation, liberalism, and encourage the fight against the presence of minority groups in Slovakia. The party routinely uses topics such as migration and vaccination to reinforce fears and stereotypes. SHO’s information policy is based on inciting fear and hatred through manipulated or completely false content. In this respect, it resembles other far-right anti-war movements from Central and Eastern Europe. SHO and its leader Róbert Švec are actively involved in organising anti-war demonstrations in Slovakia and have visited similar events in Europe.

“Slovakia needs neutrality”, election poster by Róbert Švec

Some of the most popular narrations used by SHO are:

• We want a neutral Slovakia!
• No weapons for the regime in Kiev!
• We demand withdrawal from NATO!
• Down with the dictates of Brussels!
• Let’s govern ourselves!
• NATO is a criminal organisation!

Among the most active participants in the protests is Katarina Boková, a former SHO member. Boková leads the Mothers for Peace group and has become an important voice in pre-election campaigns, especially ahead of the Slovak parliamentary and European elections. She was also a candidate for the European Parliament, strongly associated with the Kotlebovci party. Boková is a vocal critic of the EU, NATO and WHO, her narratives often focus on opposition to vaccination, criticism of the European Union, NATO, WHO, the USA, Ukraine, and Slovak President Zuzana Čaputová.

Collaboration of movements

The Slovak Revival Movement and Mothers for Peace unite the community of local anti-war formations and organise joint events and marches. The largest demonstration took place on 3 March in front of the presidential palace in Bratislava. Almost all the most prominent activists of anti-war movements and parties were present, including:

• Marian Kotleba
• Katarína Boková
• Dagmar Kramplová
• Eduard Chmelár
• Štefan Harabín
• Iveta Michalikova
• Pavol Slota

The march was organised and supported by the following movements:

• Brat za brata (Brother for Brother)
• Hnutie – Občan národ spravodlivosť (Citizen, Nation, Justice movement)
• DOMOV – Národná strana (Home – National Party)
• Národné obrodenie Slovenska (National Revival of Slovakia)
• Společenstvo národniarov Slovenska (Community of Nationalists of Slovakia)
• Vlastenecký inštitút Petra Šveca (Patriotic Institute of Petr Svec)
• OZ Slávica
• Spolok Archa
• Iniciatíva Vlastnecký Blok (Patriotic Block Initiative)
• Inicjatywa Ja za pokój (I am for Peace Initiative)
• Matky za mier (Mothers for Peace)
• Unia veteránov (Union of Veterans)

The march was held under the following slogans:

• The aggression of politicians must stop!
• Military support must end!
• Together for peace!
• No weapons for Ukraine!
• USA go home!
• Peace for our children!
• We are at home here!
• Make peace not war!
• No to weapons, no to war, yes to peace!

In contrast to the Polish and Hungarian movements, in which left-wing and far-left formations play a noticeable role, Slovak anti-war organisations have a predominantly right-wing profile. They are very happy to cooperate with their counterparts in the Czech Republic and take part in any foreign congresses.

Links between anti-war movements within the Visegrád Group

The contacts described below confirm the connections between representatives of numerous anti-war and pro-Russian movements and far-right political parties from Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, and Germany. These movements work closely together and form an international network of connections throughout Central and Eastern Europe.

Already in March 2023, a delegation of the Polish Anti-War Movement, led by Sebastian Pitoń, took part in an anti-war march in the Czech Republic. They flew banners produced especially for this occasion with the words “Polish Anti-War Movement”, “Stop Americanization of Poland”, or “This is not our war”.

Source: Screenshot, PRA/Facebook

During the celebrations on 15 March 2024, delegations of Myśl Polska (Polish Thought) from Warsaw, Katowice, Poznań, Łódź, Pabianice, Białystok, Wrocław, Opole, Leszno, Częstochowa, and Skoczów jointly celebrated the Hungarian Revolution and the war of independence in Budapest, invited by the Our Homeland movement. Over the course of the duration of different events, numerous representatives of Myśl Polska protested together with Fidesz and Our Homeland against the “insane politics of the globalists pushing Europe to war”. During this event, László Toroczkai met with Roman Fritz. A Polish delegation led by David Dosc, a member of the Polish-Hungarian interparliamentary group, visited the Hungarian parliament. The delegation also included:

• Adam Lewandowski (Stowarzyszenie Spadkobierców Weteranów II Wojny Światowej)
• Roland Dubowski (Stowarzyszenie Spadkobierców Weteranów II Wojny Światowej)
• Sławomir Zakrzewski (Stowarzyszenie Spadkobierców Weteranów II Wojny Światowej)
• Włodzimierz Gorki (Polski Ruch Lewicowy)
• Bartosz Kaczmarek (Bezpieczna Polska)
• Kamil Klimczak (Chrobry Szlak)
• Jarosław Augustyniak (Jarosław Szuka Kłopotów)

On 27 April 2024, a hybrid conference was held in Warsaw with the participation of Polish and international guests. The event entitled “Problems of European Security – How to Avoid War” also served as the official inauguration of the Fundacja Wolności Obywatelskich im. Andrzeja Leppera (Andrzej Lepper Foundation for Civil Liberties), where Mateusz Piskorski is one of the members of the board. Although the conference officially supported a diplomatic solution to the war, the participants repeated Russian rhetoric, mentioning “respect for the rights of ethnic, national and linguistic minorities in Ukraine” and the “pacification and disarmament” of Ukraine as conditions for peace. Hungary was represented by János Árgyelán, a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Our Homeland movement, who proposed holding referendums to decide the fate of the disputed territories as a potential solution to the conflict.

János is very straightforward when it comes to the Ukrainian issue:

From our point of view, the Western globalist world is now supporting a “democratic” Ukraine, which for decades has been (and still is) hostile to its minorities, including Hungarians, Russians, etc.

Besides, we have not even touched on the fact that the entire system of government of “democratic” Ukraine is based on corruption, extortion, dictatorship, murder, and chauvinistic madness, to a much greater extent than Moscow has ever experienced.

(…) Because the Ukrainian government is just a puppet and Ukraine is just a substitute playground for the globalists; they are interested in dragging more and more countries like Sweden and Finland into the war.

The list of conference participants included:

• Roman Fritz (Konfederacja Korony Polskiej)
• Przemysław Piasta (President of the Roman Dmowski National Foundation)
• Jacques Baud (former Swiss intelligence officer)
• Adam Śmiech (Myśl Polska)
• Włodzimierz Gorki (General Secretary of Polski Ruch Lewicowy)
• János Árgyelán (Foreign Office of the Hungarian Mi Hazánk party)
• Tomas Szekeres (Revival Party, Bulgaria)
• Dr Edward Karolczuk (Stowarzyszenie Marksistów Polskich)
• Krystian Jachacy (Secretary of Praca Polska)
• Konrad Rękas (Powiernictwo Kresowe/Change party)
• Roman Blaszko (journalist associated with the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia)

Also in this case, the list of organisations made it clear that pro-Russian left-wing and far-right formations, regardless of their country of origin and ideological differences, can cooperate within the political spectrum of the far right, as long as the interests and international influence of the Kremlin are at stake.

In May 2024, Roman Fritz organised a similar international meeting in Wodzisław Śląski at the Amadeus Hotel. It was attended by participants from Poland and abroad, who discussed the need for protection of nation states, the fight against “gender madness”, and “green order”, and the prospects for peace in Ukraine. Among the participants were:

• Roman Fritz (Konfederacja Korony Polskiej)
• Grzegorz Braun (Konfederacja Korony Polskiej)
• Włodzimierz Skalik (Konfederacja Korony Polskiej)
• Marta Czech (Konfederacja Korony Polskiej)
• Justyna Krasowicz (Konfederacja Korony Polskiej)
• Diana Iovanovici Șoșoacă (S.O.S. Romania)
• Milan Uhrík (Republika, MP, Slovakia)
• Steffen Kotré (AfD, Germany)
• Peter Bystron (AfD, Germany)
• János Argyelan (Mi Hazánk, Hungary)
• Tomas Szekeres (Revival Party, Bulgaria)
• Jiří Kobza (Freedom and Direct Democracy, Czech Republic)

The links between the Czech, Hungarian, Slovak and Polish movements were further confirmed by two anti-war protests that took place before the summer holidays in Prague. On 24 May 2024, a protest called “Time for Changes” was organised by the Freedom and Direct Democracy party (SPD, Czech Republic) and Identity and Democracy, a political group in the European Parliament of the ninth term, currently in dissolution. Among the participants were representatives of the Slovak National Party, including party leader Andrej Danko, Romana Tabak and Adam Lučanský.

Source: Andrej Danko/Facebook

On 1 June 2024, Czech anti-war movements and “the Czech Republic First” movement (the name refers to Donald Trump’s “America First”) during the “call for peace” demonstrations hosted a Slovak eurosceptic and far-right political party Republika, with its leader Milan Uhrík at the helm. The June protest was also attended by speakers from the Czech SPD party and the Polish Confederation party (Roman Fritz). The project gained support of many politicians and activists from several countries, including:

1. GORAN PETRONIJEVIĆ, Serbia
2. DRAGAN ĆIRJANIĆ, Serbia
3. ROMAN FRITZ, Poland
4. VLADIMIR BASENKOV, Russia
5. ELSA WIDDING, Sweden
6. MELISSA CIUMMEI, Ireland
7. MARCUS FUCHS, Germany
8. Mads PALSVIG, Denmark
9. CATHERINE AUSTIN FITTS, USA
10. ARTUR PAWLOWSKI, Canada
11. GYULA THüRMER, Hungary
12. MILAN UHRÍK, Slovakia
13. JÁN ČARNOGURSKÝ, Slovakia
14. ZDENA SAMKOVÁ, Slovakia
15. JURAJ REŽO, Slovakia
16. PETER MARČEK, Slovakia
17. ANNA GALOVIČOVÁ, Slovakia
18. JIŘÍ KOBZA, Czech Republic
19. LADISLAV VRABEL, Czech Republic
20. DAVID BOHBOT, Czech Republic
21. JAROSLAV FOLDYNA, Czech Republic
22. JIŘÍ PAROUBEK, Czech Republic
23. MILUTIN ILIČ, Czech Republic
24. JOSEF SKÁLA, Czech Republic
25. PAVEL KREJČÍ, Czech Republic
26. ANTONÍN BAUDYŠ, Czech Republic
27. IVAN NOVESKÝ, Czech Republic
28. MICHAL KLUSÁČEK, Czech Republic
29. VÁCLAV HRABÁK, Czech Republic
30. JOSEF NERUŠIL, Czech Republic
31. BŘETISLAV VONŠOVSKÝ, Czech Republic
32. VÍTĚZSLAV PILMAJER, Czech Republic
33. JANA VOLFOVÁ, Czech Republic
34. KLÁRA SAMKOVÁ, Czech Republic
35. KATARÍNA BENKO, Czech Republic
36. MAREK VYSOCKÝ, Czech Republic
37. DAGMAR WEISSABELOVÁ, Czech Republic
38. PETR BUREŠ, Czech Republic
39. ZDENĚK KEDROUTEK, Czech Republic
40. JANA PETERKOVÁ, Czech Republic
41. ZBYNĚK HROMEK, Czech Republic
42. PETR RŮŽIČKA, Czech Republic
43. ŠTEFAN BARTOK, Czech Republic
44. ALEŠ SVOBODA, Czech Republic
45. JANA KARÁSKOVÁ, Czech Republic
46. DANIEL ĎURIŠ, Czech Republic
47. ALEŠ HODINA, Czech Republic

On 14 June 2024, during a press conference held by the KKP under the slogan “Europe for Peace!”, the Sejm was visited by prominent activists of anti-war movements from the Visegrád Group. The event was attended, among others, by the previously mentioned Grzegorz Braun, Włodzimierz Skalik, Ladislav Vrabel, Roman Fritz, Milan Uhrik, Steffen Kotré, or János Árgyelán.

Foreign anti-war movements visiting the Polish Parliament; Source: KKP/Facebook

Summary

Pro-Russian anti-war movements undoubtedly cooperate closely within the Visegrád Group, maintain friendly relations, exchange information, use the same slogans, narratives and similar rhetoric. In countries such as Poland, their work is particularly difficult due to the largely sceptical attitude of the society towards Russia, but even here they managed to create efficient structures and become part of the fourth strongest grouping in the Polish parliament.

It is expected that the influence of pro-Russian anti-war movements on voters in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia will further increase, especially due to the growing fatigue of the public over the war in Ukraine and the general strengthening of European populist parties. It is worth noting that the Kremlin systematically uses the slogan “STOP the war” in its foreign influence operations, and yet arrests Russian citizens for chanting the very same slogans on the streets of Moscow.

Methodology

This report was produced in collaboration with analysts of Political Capital and GLOBSEC. It analyses the development of Polish, Hungarian, Slovak and Czech anti-war movements and the potential of their influence on the public perception of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The report aims to raise awareness among audiences and decision-makers within the EU and NATO of the need for building social resilience to harmful information operations by local actors as part of wider regional and foreign information manipulation and interference activities (FIMI).

A number of standard analytical and OSINT techniques and tools, such as Gerulata/Juno, Meltwater, Maltego or Spiderfoot, were used in creating the report. The analysis of the links between the movements was conducted based on widely available databases and domain registers. For visualisation (as part of the platform test), the Little Sis tool was used, and the contextualisation and research description were based on the DISARM framework RED. As part of attempts to better understand the specifics of Polish anti-war movements, our analysts were also present at selected events and effectively used HUMINT techniques to infiltrate the structures of one of the Polish movements.

DISARM RED

Pro-Russian anti-war movements within the V4 use a whole set of techniques to build long-term strategies of influence operations through pacifist rhetoric enriched with anti-Western and nationalist elements. Such information manipulation is usually based on mixing real and imaginary actions of NATO and EU countries and omitting those that can be unfavourable to the Russian Federation. Of course, there are some differences in the activities of the anti-war movements within the Visegrád Group, but the common basis of their operations can be described by the following characteristics according to the DISARM Framework (RED) rules.

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